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SUMMARY
This report characterizes This report characterizes the regulation of energy
markets in general and focuses on the electricity and
natural gas markets of Québec. Markets are regulated
if they are deemed to represent natural monopoly situ-
ations or if unregulated firms would not take into
account externalities that they might generate. Energy
market regulation has been justified with the claim
that regulation represents the “second-best” alterna-
tive. That is, given a situation in which there is market
failure, the outcome derived under regulation may be
better than the outcome that would arise if the market
were unregulated. Government intervention may be
required in order to protect the interests of consumers.
Energy markets have been considered natural monopoly
situations in large part because of the enormous fixed
costs associated with production and distribution.
Furthermore, electricity and natural gas are generally
considered essential goods, or more accurately, goods
with significant positive externalities from reliable
supply. A reliable supply is necessary for the proper
functioning of any modern economy and a private
market might not provide equally for all people in a
service area.
In recent years, howev r, certain segments of some
energy markets have been liberalized, since these
segments might not actually be natural monopoly situ-
ations and/or because the market may provide means
to ensure that firms internalize externalities. We
describe the experiences of a number of jurisdictions
that have experimented with energy market liberali-
zation and show that restructuring is feasible and may
provide an improvement over the status quo if market
power can be limited. 
We consider the potential for restructuring in Québec’s
energy markets which are currently mainly regulated
by the Régie de l’énergie du Québec. Québec’s elec-
tricity market does not represent a typical case for the
restructuring of the production side since the vast
majority of its generating capacity comes from hydro
projects. Over 90% of Québec’s installed electrical
capacity is hydro generated, making Québec the second
most hydro-dominated market in the world after
Norway.  Furthermore, this capacity is highly concen-
trated on three river systems. The usual model of forced
divestiture by hydrologic system is therefore likely to
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introduce market power in a restructured market, and
may lead to greater inefficiencies than those present
under regulation. In order for any market restructur-
ing to succeed, (at least) one of two approaches must
be undertaken.  A system of tradable water rights could
be established in parallel with a competitive power
pool in order to allow divestiture of individual plants
within a river system and/or Québec’s markets could
be opened to foreign production.
The retail segment of Québec’s energy markets 
could potentially benefit from liberalization. The only
obvious difference between Québec’s energy markets 
and those in other jurisdictions is Québec’s price-
equalization policy. Lower prices could prevail if 
competition were introduced to the markets for 
electricity and natural gas, but not for all consumers.
Québec’s insistence on uniform prices throughout the
province means that some consumers are currently
paying below market price for energy. Prices for these
consumers could rise if the market is restructured.
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nergy market liberalization has taken place or is currently underway in
regions throughout the world. Meanwhile, Québec’s energy markets
remain mainly regulated by the Régie de l’énergie du Québec. In particular, the
Régie oversees Québec’s electricity and natural gas sectors. In this report, we will
discuss the economic rationale that led to regulation of electricity and natural
gas markets in the first place and explain the current trend towards restructur-
ing. We will examine Québec’s electricity and natural gas markets and the role
of the Régie in their functioning, and we will consider the potential for the
restructuring of energy markets in Québec.
While Québec’s electricity and natural gas markets are both regulated by the
Régie, they are very different. Québec is a huge producer of electricity, generat-
ing nearly one-third of all Canadian capacity. Over 90% of Québec’s installed
electrical capacity is hydro generated, making Québec the second most hydro-
dominated market in the world after Norway. Much of this capacity is produced
far from the principal consumers of power at large-scale generating complexes
and travels long distances to the retail market. On the other hand, Québec
produces no natural gas at all, importing instead from Western Canada via the
TransCanada Pipeline. Once in Québec, gas is sold to consumers or exported 
to the U.S.
International experiences demonstrate that restructuring energy markets is possi-
ble but often difficult to implement. It is now recognized that the generation
and retail segments of energy markets are not necessarily natural monopoly situ-
ations, and so restructuring is feasible and is likely to provide an improvement
over the status quo where market failure due to externalities and excessive market
power can be eliminated. However, at least in the case of Québec’s electricity
market, any attempt at restructuring must take into account the fact that a large
fraction of the installed capacity is generated at very large hydro complexes 
on individual river systems, making the construction of new hydro-electric 
facilities, or forced divestiture, more complicated.
Introduction
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International 
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PART ONE
Energy Market Regulation
1.1 The Economics of Regulation
he goal of regulation is to reproduce as closely as possible the advantages
of a competitive market or, alternatively, to minimize the impacts of
market failure. If a market is truly competitive, the last unit of electricity or natu-
ral gas supplied to the market would not reduce social welfare, nor could social
welfare be increased by producing additional energy. This directly implies that
marginal social cost pricing must occur in a truly competitive market. Firms in
a competitive market would have incentive to reduce costs as much as possible,
since this would allow them to earn greater profits given the market price. A
regulated energy market cannot accomplish these goals simultaneously. Generally
speaking, a regulator may choose to regulate firms based on a cost-of-service
condition or a price-cap. Under cost-of-service regulation, a firm is permitted
to charge a price that allows it to recoup its costs, but not to experience an
economic profit. Under this regulatory approach, it is possible to ensure marginal
cost pricing; however, the firm faces no incentive to reduce its aggregate cost of
production, since no further profits will be experienced. Alternatively, the regu-
lator can impose a price-cap, whereby firms are constrained by a maximum price
they can charge for power sold on the market. In this case, incentives exist for
firms to reduce costs, since they can increase profits; however, this does not come
with a coincidental decrease in price. There are margins on which this technique
can be improved, principally through creative price-cap schemes and more
frequent adjustments. In the natural gas industry, the advent of negotiated,
multi-year settlements between pipeline operators and distributors signalled an
era of lighter regulatory control. Stoft (2002) argues that historically, regulation
has erred on the side of driving prices down toward marginal costs, to the likely
detriment of incentives for cost reduction.
The goal of 
regulation is to
reproduce as closely
as possible the
advantages of a
competitive market
or, alternatively, 
to minimize the
impacts of market
failure.
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The fact that a regulated energy market cannot simultaneously involve marginal
social cost pricing and incentives for cost reduction leads us to question why
energy markets are so often heavily regulated. The justification most often
proposed is that regulation represents the “second best” alternative. That is,
given a situation in which there is market failure, the outcome derived under
regulation may be better than the outcome that would arise if the market were
unregulated. In particular, industries that are characterized by externalities or
by natural monopoly may require government intervention in order to protect
the interests of consumers — particularly if the good or service is deemed 
essential. Externalities are generated when the behaviour of one economic agent
affects the well-being of another. If the externality generated is positive, since
the producing agents fail to take into account the external benefits provided by
their behaviour, too little of the good is produced from a social perspective. If
the externality generated is negative, too much is produced.
While negative externalities are important to consider as a motivation for 
regulation, the existence of positive externalities and public-good production
should also be considered. If a good or service is deemed essential but the cost
of provision is such that the private market might not supply it to all people in
a service area at affordable or equal prices, governments may intervene.
Consumption by a group for whom the marginal cost of provision is quite low
can subsidize consumption by a group for whom the cost is quite high.
The other market failure that leads to government intervention is the existence
of a natural monopoly situation. A market is said to be a natural monopoly situ-
ation if it is cheaper for one firm to serve the entire market than it would be for
more than one firm. Usually, natural monopoly is associated with economies of
scale — average costs that are always decreasing in quantity. Faced with such a
cost curve, a single large producer is able to drive competitors out of the market,
at which point it can charge the monopoly price. If entry is unrestricted, consumers
could face fluctuating prices since competitors will be attracted to the market
by the single firm’s positive economic profits. Upon entry, the incumbent would
again lower price to drive the entrants from the market. Regulation is necessary
to control entry and limit the exercising of market power by the single producer.
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Figure 1
Range of subadditivity
However, it is important to note that even if the average cost schedule is not
declining over all ranges of output, but is instead u-shaped, it may still be more
efficient for a single firm to provide for the entire the market. That is, it may still
be a natural monopoly situation. Consider the following market structures: (i)
a single firm serves the entire market and has a u-shaped average cost curve  ACS,
and (ii) n firms (with identical cost structures to that of the single firm) serve
the market with industry-average cost curve (ACI). We are interested in deter-
mining the output levels for which a single firm yields the least-cost production
alternative. Figure 1 helps us make such a determination. Even to the right of
the minimum of AC S , where diseconomies of scale exist, it is still the case 
that it is cheaper for one firm to serve the entire market. The single firm is the
least-cost producer up to the output level Y*, where  ACS and  AC I intersect.
In general, we can say that an industry is considered to be a natural monopoly
if costs in the industry are subadditive over the entire relevant range of output
levels (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig, 1982). Again, regulation is necessary since
price fluctuations could occur if the market-demand curve intersects the single
firm’s average cost curve (AC S) to the right of its minimum, but to the left of its
intersection with  AC I. It is still cheaper for a single firm to serve the entire
market, but socially inefficient entry may occur. Potential entrants may be
attracted to the market, even if the single firm is only earning normal profits,
since they can produce a smaller output at lower cost.
B
U
R
G
U
N
D
Y
R
E
P
O
R
T
09
C
IR
A
N
O
1.2 Energy Market Regulation
Energy market regulation in different jurisdictions has been put into place for
one or more of the reasons described above. Electricity and natural gas are gener-
ally considered essential goods. As a result, governments have intervened in
energy markets to ensure low and stable prices that are roughly equal for all of
their constituents. Consumption by residents of large, urban areas for whom the
marginal cost of provision is quite low subsidizes the distribution of electricity
or natural gas to those living in more remote areas. The private market would
not provide equally for all people in a service area, and so, since the supply of
energy is considered an essential service, it has historically been felt that private
provision would come at a high social cost.
Electricity and natural gas markets may be characterized by the presence of
externalities, especially when producers do not pay for environmental damage
as a result of pipeline construction, displacement of people for reservoir creation,
and other severe social costs. Also, if multiple hydro-electricity generating plants
owned by different firms were located on a single river system, the decisions
made by the upstream plant would impose externalities on the downstream
plant. When enforceable property rights do not exist for all of the inputs to
energy production, the government may choose to impose regulations such that
social costs be implicitly taken into account by producers.
Energy markets have generally been viewed as natural monopoly situations,
in large part because of the enormous fixed costs associated with energy 
production and distribution. A generalizable characteristic of energy production
(generation, extraction) is increasing returns to scale over at least some range of
output. This implies that a doubling of output does not require a doubling of
all inputs, but often substantially less. In the case of electricity, this is seen as
declining costs of generation per MWh (megawatt-hour), while in the gas 
industry this takes the form of decreased per-cubic-metre extraction and 
delivery costs.
Stoft (2002) argues that for most types of electricity generation (namely, nuclear
and coal-fired), the level of technology determines the limits up to which
economies of scale are generally available. In contrast, for hydro-electric projects,
the optimal scale is determined, for the most part, by the specific project.
Governments 
have intervened 
in energy markets 
to ensure low and
stable prices that
are roughly equal
for all of their
constituents.
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In the transmission of power, economies of scale are generally known to exist
within a service area, but not between service areas (Stoft, 2003). It is intuitive
that there could be gains from high-tension lines between a generating plant
and a municipality, as compared to low voltage transmission, but there would
be few gains in efficiency to serving multiple service areas. The logic of state-
owned utilities has been the ability to exploit returns to scale in transmission
and generation simultaneously. In essence, transmission lines have gains across
service areas if they allow two municipalities to be served by a single, large plant
rather than two smaller ones.
Hydro retail sales represent a separate market segment which includes only the
billing and metering of electricity. Nonetheless, since electricity is deemed an
essential service, governments have generally felt it necessary to couple this
segment with the distribution of power (the lines running from house to house).
As discussed above, it is clear that the distribution segment of the market is able
to realize significant economies of scale; as a result of this coupling, retail sales
have been traditionally handled by monopoly providers.
In natural gas markets, the fixed costs of extraction represent a large part of any
firm’s commitment to the industry. Once a particular firm has discovered (and
secured rights to a particular deposit of natural gas), investment takes place in
drilling equipment (which may include offshore platforms), pipelines, and
compressors (for distribution). Gas is extracted and transmitted to large-scale
consumers (industrial users and utilities) using external sources of energy, and
many of these techniques exhibit increasing returns to scale. In general, gas
extraction exhibits increasing returns to scale within a field, but not across fields,
since the fixed costs are field-specific. The same is true for pipelines, where we
can see significant unit-cost savings by looping, increasing pressure, or expand-
ing pipeline size; however, there are limited scale economies across pipelines.
The unit cost of delivered gas from a particular source is thus generally 
considered to be a decreasing function of the size of the gas resource and the
exploitation investment (Banks, 2003).
Electricity and natural gas vary greatly in the technology employed for the 
storage and distribution of their respective forms of energy. The use of storage
facilities is a very important link in the chain between production and retail
sales of natural gas, while in the electricity market, all electricity in the system
clears every fraction of a second. Gas storage and distribution certainly exhibits
increasing returns to scale in a service area (from economies of density and usage
patterns), but these are virtually non-existent across service areas (Banks, 2003).
Energy markets 
have generally 
been viewed as
natural monopoly 
situations, in large
part because of the
enormous fixed
costs associated
with energy 
production and
distribution. 
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n principle, as discussed above, regulation is put into place to invoke a second-
best outcome; the best outcome that can be achieved when there is market
failure. Energy markets are regulated because the assumed existence of scale
economies renders energy production by monopolists (or oligopolists) cheaper
than the competitive alternative, and/or because firms in unregulated environ-
ments will not take into account the externalities they generate. It is important
as part of the regulatory process to re-evaluate constantly the continued exis-
tence of (or potential for) this market failure. If it is reasonable to expect that
the market could function efficiently, then there may be substantial allocative
losses to regulation. Moreover, it is not always clear that governments intervene
strictly to address market imperfections. Economists point out that empirical
evidence suggests that regulation is in fact not associated with market failure
(Viscusi et al., 2000). Therefore, the theoretical justification presented above--
regulation to address externalities, natural monopoly situations or public good
provision--may not be compelling. An alternative theory is that economic 
regulation arises because of the influence of interest groups, not as a result of
potential benefits to society as a whole. According to this hypothesis, the firms
in an industry lobby the government to intervene since regulation actually favours
producers. This hypothesis further predicts that eventually, the regulatory agency
of the government will end up under the influence of the firms in the industry
(Viscusi, et al., 2000). Whether or not regulation was initially welfare improv-
ing, the evolution of the market may have led to a situation where the potential
allocations without regulation dominate those under regulation, such that the
outcome no longer represents the second-best.
Liberalization of energy markets has taken place in a number of jurisdictions
throughout North America and around the world, and many more are consid-
ering doing the same. For a government contemplating the restructuring of its
energy markets, the critical question is: When regulatory controls are removed,
what will transpire? The motivation for restructuring is the view that some parts
Energy Market Restructuring
PART TWO
I
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of electricity and natural gas markets do not represent natural monopoly situ-
ations, and so if these segments are restructured and competition is permitted,
greater efficiencies will arise. In particular, it is generally felt that it is primarily
the transmission and distribution portions of energy supply that present natu-
ral monopoly situations. In most electricity and natural gas markets, the retail
and production sectors have been found to reap substantial potential benefits
from competition and the real-time marginal cost pricing that is supposed to
ensue. The goal of restructuring efforts has been to produce benefits for consumers
in the form of the lowest prices possible while guaranteeing a reliable supply
and maintaining or creating incentives to innovate.
Although each jurisdiction that has engaged in the restructuring of its energy
markets has adopted a somewhat different approach, some common threads
which constitute a basic model of energy sector restructuring can be seen (Joskow,
2003). The vertically integrated energy-providing monopolist is dismantled and
ownership of production, transmission, systems operations, distribution and
retail segments is vertically separated. The potentially competitive segments,
namely production, marketing and retail supply, are separated from the segments
that remain regulated (transmission, distribution, systems operation). Since
imposing competition in transmission and distribution would imply building
new supply grids or pipelines, the transmission and distribution portion of
energy supply is usually thought to represent a natural monopoly situation
(Wolak, 2003). Usually a single, independent transmission company is integrated
with the system operations and is overseen by an independent systems operator
whose responsibility it is to ensure sufficient energy is available to satisfy demand.
Entry of producers is encouraged and sometimes accelerated with forced 
divestiture. Retail segments are functionally separated from distribution segments
of the original utility.
What are the benefits of restructuring energy production markets to allow for
competition? The principal rationale holds that this will lead to greater 
efficiency, more appropriate allocation of risk and potentially cleaner produc-
tion. According to Joskow (1997), restructured electricity markets can expect to
realize efficiency gains in the medium-run through the improvement of gener-
ating facilities, such that inefficient plants can be shut down and labour produc-
tivity can be improved. In the long-run, new investment in generating facilities
can be expected where demand will support it, since competitive rates of return
will now be available on capital investment. The competitive market should
provide incentive to control costs and to innovate. As a result, in some markets,
dirty coal-fired plants may be replaced with natural gas and aero-derivative,
combined-cycle generating technology (Joskow, 1997).
C
IR
A
N
O
B
U
R
G
U
N
D
Y
R
E
P
O
R
T
13
In order for wholesale market competition to occur, a clearing house must exist
in which energy supply and demand are allowed to determine the price. A spot
energy market is usually created such that supply of and demand for energy may
be balanced through the setting of the spot price. End-use consumers can purchase
their energy directly on these spot markets or from competing retailers. The
latter either purchase energy on the wholesale market or generate it themselves.
Many regions have also incorporated forward or futures markets or long-term
contracts into their restructuring programs, in an attempt to smooth out market
fluctuations and provide better signals of anticipated supply and demand.
In restructured markets, consumers are allowed to purchase energy directly on
the wholesale market if they like, or through agents or marketers. Usually, a
single agent, the current monopoly retailer, remains in place and acts on behalf
of consumers on the wholesale market. In addition, a competitive market implies
that the consumer no longer bears the risk of the technology choice, construc-
tion cost overruns, and operating mistakes. It is important to distinguish the
restructuring of the retail market from the necessary imposition of real-time or
time-of-use pricing schemes. These are not intrinsically linked, although they
are often associated (Stoft, 2002).
Real-time pricing is the name given to a system which charges prices which differ
by day and by hour of the day. Real-time pricing does not necessarily imply that
the retail price is equal to the wholesale price, but it may well be based on the
wholesale price. Time-of-use pricing is generally the term given to pricing schemes
whereby a specific schedule of prices is predetermined based on the time of day,
and usually remains fixed for a given period of time, either a month or a season
(Borenstein, 2001).
If either of these time-of-day pricing schemes is implemented, further gains can
be achieved as rational consumers will adapt their behaviour in order to maxi-
mize their utility. For example, while there is currently no incentive to displace
high-load tasks outside of peak hours, the imposition of peak-load pricing may
alter this behaviour for cost-saving reasons. The upshot of this is that the ratio
between peak and base load decreases, and therefore energy becomes cheaper.
There is some dispute over the effectiveness of this sort of pricing scheme in
reducing generation costs. Stoft (2002) argues that since load factors for elec-
tricity production are currently relatively low in most jurisdictions, the cost
savings to real-time billing would not be as large as many predict. The success
of fixed-price contracts in restructured electricity markets as well as traditional
markets such as heating oil show that consumers are willing to pay a premium
for insurance against price risk. This is not reflected in Stoft’s analysis, so it
remains unclear whether real-time billing will lead to reductions in overall
consumer expenditure.
In restructured
markets, consumers
are allowed to
purchase energy
directly on the
wholesale market 
if they like, or
through agents 
or marketers. 
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Other suppliers have chosen to implement demand charges, which imply a charge
based on the maximum use of power during any fixed time interval (usually a fifteen-
minute period) during the billing cycle. Borenstein (2001) argues that the economic
incentives established here are a highly imperfect proxy for either of the time-of-day
pricing schemes discussed above. There is little incentive for a given household to
displace household power usage outside of aggregate peak demand. It is clear that the
reason that aggregate peaks exist is because many consumers within a jurisdiction are
using large loads simultaneously, so there may be some effect from customers trying
to reduce their individual peak demand. In any case, the effect of this scheme on the
retail price charged to consumers must be less than that outlined above by Stoft (2002).
Many governments have chosen not to fully liberalize the retail electricity market. In
Ontario, California, and Alberta, some form of retail price cap was implemented in
the market as part of the restructuring of the production and/or retail sectors. In this
case, the price cap creates scarcity, since supply will not equal demand wherever the
cap is binding, and thus the market operator must choose between blackouts, or subsi-
dizing the shortfall from government coffers. In California and Ontario, this has been
the chosen approach.
Natural gas market properties on the retail side are very similar to those of electric-
ity, where retail implies metering and billing of gas provided to residences by the
distributor. The retailer purchases distribution rights to a bulk quantity of gas, which
it then sells to its customers. The presence of competition and a regulated distribu-
tion authority should drive price to marginal cost in this market as well. It is also clear
that there are benefits to the reduction of peaks and valleys in demand for natural gas,
although contrary to electricity, where these are felt in diminishing needs for peaking
plants, the natural gas savings occur through a reduced need for storage facilities.
The final element of a restructured energy market is some sort of regulatory oversight
mechanism. This, at the limit, will take the form of anti-trust oversight, ensuring that
no party is able to exercise market power. In some cases, there may be more heavy
regulatory oversight of restructured markets (Wolak, 2003). In many jurisdictions,
this will imply greater control of environmental externalities. In regulated markets,
projects are approved, and prices set by government agencies, and these prices can 
be assumed to reflect, in some measure, the social cost of generating electricity. At
least the project-approval decision should reflect a net social benefit. Under private
production, project adoption and pricing decisions are made at the firm level, so it
will be up to the regulator to assure, as with any industry, that the private costs of
production accurately reflect the social costs.
There are of course some costs involved with energy market restructuring. In particular,
there is the potential for market power to arise if there is insufficient competition in the
marketplace. As a result of the specific characteristics of the electricity market, wherein
there exists inelastic short-run demand in combination with a good that has no shelf-
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Wolak (2003)
proposes five key
conditions (...) 
meant to ensure 
that energy producers 
face as elastic a 
residual demand
curve as possible.
life, the gains to the exploitation of market power are very large for firms, and
as such must be carefully monitored (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000). Given the
nature of the good as an essential service with immense positive externalities,
consumption implies that the social costs to a service interruption may outweigh
the private costs, so it is possible that sufficient new investment to ensure supply
may not come online in time. Instituting real-time pricing also involves heavy
start-up costs in the form of new metres capable of allowing for such a system.
Divestiture can also be difficult, since responsibility for the stranded costs of the
vertically integrated utility must somehow be assigned. Finally, there are envi-
ronmental and other externality concerns that must be addressed if a market is
to be restructured. If these externalities are not addressed, price will be driven
down to marginal private costs, and social losses due to pollution and other
external effects may exceed those from the existing regulation.
We have described the manner in which energy market restructuring generally
has taken place. The success of any attempt at restructuring depends on a number
of factors. Wolak (2003) proposes five key conditions necessary for the successful
restructuring of energy markets. Essentially, these conditions are meant to ensure
that energy producers face as elastic a residual demand curve as possible in order
to prevent (or at least reduce) the exercise of unilateral market power:
1) There must be actual competition in the market. No dominant firm can
exist since firms will exercise market power if they have it, and so forced
divestiture must be undertaken if necessary.
2) There must be a forward market for the energy source in question. Forward
markets incite suppliers to bid more aggressively on the spot market, result-
ing in more elastic demand curves. Energy a supplier purchases on the spot
market may represent a cheaper way of satisfying its long-term commit-
ment than energy it could generate itself. Forward contracts can also help
to raise current funding for investment in new capacity.
3) Consumers must be involved in the wholesale market and ideally some form
of real-time pricing must be adopted in order to shift demand across times
of day.
4) The transmission system must have sufficient capacity to allow distant firms
to act as competition for local providers. Without an extensive transmis-
sion network, the result is essentially just a series of local monopolies.
5) There must exist a credible regulatory mechanism. Monitoring must be
ongoing in order to deal with the inevitable flaws in the restructuring process.
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A brief analysis of the energy market restructuring experiences of a number of
jurisdictions demonstrates the importance of the conditions proposed by Wolak
(2003). In what follows, we examine the energy markets in England and Wales,
Alberta, Ontario, and California. The first two markets have seen reasonable
success from restructuring, and have generally met the conditions set out above.
On the other hand, in the province of Ontario and the state of California, where
the conditions mentioned above have not been met, existing producers can exer-
cise market power and the results have been disastrous.
2.1 Energy Market Restructuring in England and
Wales
In the past two decades both the electricity and natural gas markets have been
restructured in England and Wales and the transition has been fairly successful.
Prior to the Electricity Act of 1989, the Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB) was the sole generator and distributor of electricity in England and
Wales and was operated as a cost-of-service public utility. As a result of restruc-
turing, the electricity market has been broken into four separate segments: gener-
ation, transmission, distribution and retail sales (Wolak, 2004). The generation
segment was split into three companies: the publicly owned Nuclear Electric
was granted control of all nuclear power plants, while all fossil fuel plants were
privatized into two competing firms, National Power and PowerGen. Twelve
privatized regional electric companies (REC’s) were formed to distribute elec-
tricity. These distributors must allow competitors to transmit power over their
systems at the same price that they charge themselves. Initially, these companies
had ownership over the company that operated the transmission network, the
National Grid Company (NGC). In addition to operating the grid, the NGC
also acted as the power exchange, clearing supply and demand by determining
spot prices. Forward trading was also allowed, although only of contracts for
differences (mutual hedging contracts between producers and distributors involv-
ing a benchmark price for an agreed-upon quantity of electricity at an agreed-
upon period of time). In 1995, the REC’s were required to divest their owner-
ship of the NGC. Its operation of the transmission network is now overseen by
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets and power is now traded on the London
Stock Exchange (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004a).
The retail market was also liberalized. Immediately, customers with peak demands
of at least 1 MW (so-called nonfranchise customers) were permitted to choose
their suppliers from among the twelve RECs or to purchase directly from National
Power or PowerGen. The 1 MW limit was lowered to 100 kW (kilowatts) in 1994,
and as of 1999 all customers were allowed to choose their supplier (Wolak, 2004).
As of 2003, the REC’s serviced 61% of the available customers, while new entrants
serviced the remainder (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004a). In fact, 38% of domestic
electricity users have switched suppliers (Zhou, 2003).
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Moreover, the retail market involves some degree of time-of-use pricing, if not
real-time pricing. Some residential customers and most commercial and 
industrial users pay a fixed-price per MWh for consumption during the day and
a different fixed-price per MWh for night-time use (Wolak, 2004).
Following restructuring, prices in England and Wales initially increased as National
Power and PowerGen were able to exercise market power. Although some new
capacity had come online following the Act (combined-cycle gas-turbine tech-
nology facilities), the combined market share of National Power and PowerGen
still exceeded 50% in 1995 (Wolak, 2004). In an effort to rectify this problem,
further divestiture of the two companies was ordered and the New Energy Trading
Agreements (NETA) replaced the Electricity Pool in 2001. Under these agree-
ments, the uniform price system that had been in place, which determined the
uniform market clearing price based on the system marginal price, was replaced
with a bilateral, pay-as-bid system trading between generators, retail interme-
diaries, traders and customers. Under the new system, prices are determined
through individual transactions between traders (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004a).
Also under NETA, forward contracting of actually physical delivery was allowed
(Bower, 2002).
Between 1999 and 2003, total generation capacity in England and Wales increased
from 73200 MW to 78900 MW (Zhou, 2003). From 1998, when the NETA was
first announced until the end of the first year of its implementation (2002),
wholesale spot electricity prices fell by 40%.(Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004a).
In addition to lower prices, the electricity market in England and Wales has
moved towards cleaner production - its dependence on coal-fired generation
has been reduced. Between 1993 and 2000, the generation capacity of major
power producers in combined-cycle gas turbines increased from about 1400 MW
to about 20000 MW (Zhou, 2003).
The restructuring of the natural gas market in England and Wales has followed a
similar path. The vertically integrated monopolist British Gas was privatized in
1986 and the Office of Gas was formed to oversee its activities. In 1996 it was
broken up into a supply component, transportation and storage component, and
a research and development component. On the retail side, beginning in 1992,
large industrial and commercial consumers were allowed to choose their suppli-
ers, providing incentive for new providers to enter the market. By 1998, all customers
were allowed to choose their supplier (Energy Information Administration, 2004).
Indeed, 37% of customers have switched providers (Zhou, 2003).
From 1998, when 
the NETA was first
announced until the
end of the first year
of its implementation
(2002), wholesale
spot electricity prices
fell by 40%.
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2.2 Electricity Market Restructuring in Alberta
Daniel et al. (2001) argue that Alberta makes a very interesting test case for
energy-market restructuring because it is large enough to provide the same
general challenges and potential advantages of restructuring as in California and
Ontario without the complicating factors brought about by the interconnect-
edness of those markets.
Prior to restructuring, Alberta had three vertically integrated monopolies:
Edmonton Power, TransAlta Utilities, and ATCO Electric, that generated, trans-
mitted and distributed electricity in Alberta. These companies operated under
franchise monopolies and were regulated on a cost-of-service basis. The whole-
sale market in Alberta has been integrated and jointly managed since the 1970’s,
with generation capacity being dispatched centrally over the three service areas.
Alberta is essentially isolated from other electricity grids, with only 550 MW of
interconnecting transmission lines, so it is impossible to make up substantial
excess demand.
The Electric Utilities Act was tabled in 1995 and restructured Alberta’s energy
markets. Wholesale prices were to be determined by supply and demand in a
power pool. Generating plants were to have open access to the transmission
system, and there was to be more competition in electricity generation. Changes
to the system included the establishment of an independent power pool, through
which wholesale prices would be determined on an hourly basis. The wholesale
price would apply only to new generating capacity, not to existing capacity held
by the three large utilities. Furthermore, consumers whose retail demand was
served by the large utilities would also be insulated from the pool price, under
what were called legislated hedges.
Higher than forecast economic growth in the province led to a tightening of the
electricity market in the late 1990’s (Daniel et al., 2001). Since the legislative
hedges provided no incentive to invest in new generating capacity, no new capac-
ity came online. Daniel et al. argue that despite the hedges, the tightening market
should have sent long-run signals on the potential profitability of future invest-
ment. This was, however, likely mitigated by policy uncertainty.
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Overall, the Alberta experience seems
to be one of cautious progression
toward the stated objectives.
(Daniel et al. 2003) 
In response to this lack of new investment, Alberta passed an Amendment to
the Electric Utilities Act in 1998 which called for the removal of the legislated
hedges in 2001. Furthermore, in order to encourage competition, the govern-
ment decided to force the existing utilities to auction off their ownership rights
to the electricity from the remaining life of their regulated units. The new owners
of these units were required to bid all of their electricity capacity into the Power
Pool. Alberta also established the Watt Exchange in 2001, a futures market which
trades one-month, three-month, and one-year-out contracts. It is evident that
these additional changes to the regulatory framework make the established system
much more consistent with the requirements set out by Wolak (2003).
Since it has taken these steps, competition in Alberta has increased; there are
now eight firms bidding electricity into the Alberta Power pool. Moreover, since
1998, approximately 3000 MW of new generating capacity have become oper-
ational and proposals for 5200 MW of new generation have been announced in
Alberta’s electricity market. Wholesale prices have continued to increase, likely
because the retail side of the market is still not fully liberalized and because
Alberta’s transmission network, as discussed above, does not have very much
import capacity, since it is connected only to neighbouring British Columbia
and Saskatchewan (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004a). In fact, retail prices will not be
completely liberalized until 2006.
Overall, the Alberta experience seems to be one of cautious progression toward
the stated objectives (Daniel et al. 2003). In the beginning, measures were taken
to recognize and mitigate the potential for the exercise of market power through
the legislated hedges. In some sense, these provided a buffer while the wholesale
market was established. When it became evident that there was not a significant
ability for prices to signal the need for new investment in a tight market, some
of these restrictions were relaxed, resulting in less potential for the exercising of
market power. The key problem which has not been addressed is that retail prices
are isolated from real-time fluctuations in the wholesale price.
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The competitive
market opened on
May 1, 2002 and
prices quickly began
to rise.  The average
hourly energy price
was 3.01 cents per
kWh in May, 3.71
cents in June and
6.2 cents in July. 
2.3 Electricity Market Restructuring in Ontario
In Ontario, prior to restructuring, generation and transmission and some 
distribution of electricity had been provided by Ontario Hydro. Small amounts
of distribution were done by municipal distributors. Wholesale rates and the
rates charged to large industrial customers and to rural customers were reviewed
by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), which could make recommendations but
could not insist on rate changes. In the late 1990’s, Ontario began its transition
to a competitive market. The idea was to allow consumers to contract with any
energy retailer they wanted, to leave the transmission and distribution segments
to be regulated by the OEB and to split Ontario Hydro into five separate enti-
ties (Littlechild and Yatchew, 2002). These were: i. Hydro One Inc., which is
responsible for the transmission and distribution segments; ii. Ontario Power
Generation Inc., which owns 75% of Ontario’s generating capacity; iii. Independent
Electricity Market Operator Inc., whose job it is to dispatch power and operate
the electricity market; iv. the Electrical Safety Authority Inc., which is in charge
of installation inspection; and v. Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation Inc.,
whose responsibility it is to manage the existing debt (as of 1999, $38.1 billion)
(Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b). Ontario Power Generation was subject to an 
average annual revenue cap of 3.8 cents per kWh (kilowatt-hour) and was to
reduce its share of the province’s generating capacity to 35%. In an effort to do
so, Ontario Power Generation leased the Bruce nuclear power plants to the private
sector in 2001 and sold four hydro plants in 2002 (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b).
A wholesale market was created and consumers could establish physical or finan-
cial contracts with wholesale sellers or generators. The retail side of the market
was also set to be liberalized, and customers were allowed to purchase fixed-price
contracts from retailers or remain with their local utility, which would supply
them at the spot price (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b).
The competitive market opened on May 1, 2002 and prices quickly began to rise.
The average hourly energy price was 3.01 cents per kWh in May, 3.71 cents in
June and 6.2 cents in July. The provincial government reacted by enacting the
Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply Act, 2002, on December 9, 2002.
This Act restricted the price of electricity to 4.3 cents per kWh for low-volume
consumers. It was increased on April 1, 2004 to 4.7 cents per kWh for the first
750 kWh/month, then 5.5 cents after and there will be a new pricing structure
as of May 2005 (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b).
From the beginning, the situation was one of insufficient supply. Ontario relied
heavily on nuclear power and much of this had gone offline just prior to restruc-
turing (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b). Furthermore, little new capacity came
online prior to restructuring. In fact, just two generating plants were constructed,
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capable of generating only 620 MW of electricity (Hrab and Trebilcock, 2004b).
The price ceiling will only exacerbate the problem. As a result of the price controls
there has been no new investment in generating capacity, and the problem is set
to become worse as the Ontario provincial government has promised to retire
coal-fired plants in the upcoming years.
2.4 Energy Market Restructuring in California
Prior to restructuring, there were three privately owned, vertically integrated
utilities that generated, transmitted and distributed electricity within predeter-
mined service areas in California. These companies’ prices and service require-
ments were regulated by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
While these companies operated their own generating facilities, they were also
able to buy power from other western states, Mexico, and Canada.
In the late 1980’s in the U.S., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
promoted the opening of energy markets to competition. In this context, California
embarked on a program which aimed to promote a competitive market for gener-
ation. The California legislature passed Bill AB1890 in 1996, the essential elements
of which are summarized by Joskow (2001):
• Consumers would be able to choose between their current service provider
and a set of new firms in the market.
• Existing utilities were required to provide access to transmission and 
distribution networks at prices determined by FERC and the CPUC.
• Existing utilities’ retail prices were fixed in proportion to the  wholesale,
day-ahead price of electricity.
• Provisions were made for utilities to recover stranded costs through divestiture.
• Utilities were allowed to issue bonds for recovery of some portion of stranded
costs. The return on these bonds was to be guaranteed by the state.
• Residential and small commercial customers received an instantaneous 
10% price decrease (a price cap).
• Existing utilities were responsible for installing an independent system 
operator and a power pool.
• Forced divestiture of fossil-fuel generation facilities for the two largest utilities.
New generating capacity was expected to come online from independent service
providers, and independent firms would also be able to purchase divested fossil-
fuel capacity from the existing utilities.
Things certainly did not go as planned. Between 1999 and 2000, prices in the
wholesale market increased by 500%. In 2001 peak prices were $300/MWh,
which represented a ten-fold increase over 1998 and 1999 prices. The two largest 
utilities became insolvent, as they were forced to purchase power on the whole-
sale market at prices ten times above previous prices, but retail prices were capped
at 10% below 1998 prices. In order to combat this trend, retail prices were raised
by 40% in 2001. At about the same time, falling national natural gas prices and
specifically regional natural gas prices, combined with the return/installation
of previously unavailable capacity and the decrease in power demand caused by
the price increase, resulted in a dramatic fall in the wholesale price.
In the aftermath of these events, the independent system operator declared
bankruptcy, and the CPUC terminated retail competition. Joskow (2001) lists
several lessons learned from the California crisis, and many of these reflect the
fact that the efforts to restructure the delivery of electricity in California did not
meet the criteria laid out in Wolak (2003). First, the California restructuring
experiment insulated consumers from the wholesale market. If consumers are
not provided with price signals on the scarcity of power, then the restructured
market cannot be expected to achieve the desired allocative efficiency. Second,
market power continued to exist in California, specifically on the part of the
natural gas suppliers. Joskow (2001) cites the existence of a premium on natu-
ral gas sales to Southern California during the crisis. Since the competitive fringe
of the wholesale market was, by design, made up only of fossil-fuel plants, the
natural gas suppliers were able to exercise market power over this segment of
the market, extracting higher prices for gas as the wholesale price for power was
free to rise unabated.
California’s restructuring experience provides clear evidence of the important
role of market power and consumer price signals in ensuring the success of a
restructured energy market.
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Between 1999 and 2000, prices in the wholesale
market increased by 500%.
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Québec’s Energy Markets
PART THREE
3.1 Energy Regulation in Québec
ntil the 1940’s, Québec’s electricity was provided by a small number of
privately owned enterprises. In 1944, concerned about high electricity
prices relative to those in Ontario, the Québec government expropriated 
ownership of the monopoly provider in Montréal and formed a provincial crown
corporation — Hydro-Québec (Dupré and Patry, 1998). Rural electricity 
provision was left in the hands of the Rural Electrification Agency. In 1963,
Québec’s electricity system was made almost entirely public. As a vertically inte-
grated entity, Hydro-Québec’s mandate was to take advantage of Québec’s endow-
ment of hydraulic resources to the benefit of the residents of Québec and to
ensure that all of Québec had access to electricity at uniform rates. Rates were
to be set such that they covered only investment and operational costs. (The
National Energy Board, 2001).
Natural gas was provided by a number of private companies, among them Gaz
Métro, which by the 1980’s had essentially become the monopoly provider in
Québec. Since the market was not being serviced by a crown corporation, as was
the case with electricity, it was regulated by the Régie du gaz naturel.
In June of 1997, the Régie de l’énergie was created, replacing the Régie du gaz
naturel, and is now responsible for regulating major energy markets in Québec.
According to the Act Respecting the Régie de l’énergie, 2001 (Éditeur Officiel du
Québec, 2001), the Régie is responsible for fixing the rates and conditions for the
transmission of electricity by the carrier and the distribution of electricity by the
distributor. It is also responsible for fixing rates reflecting the costs of acquisition,
transmission, delivery, and storage of natural gas obtained through domestic
suppliers Gaz Métro and Gazifère. The Régie is also charged with making sure
that consumers are adequately supplied with both electricity and natural gas.
Rates are determined after consideration of numerous factors. The rate base takes
into consideration the fair value of the assets used for electric power transmission
or natural gas distribution, research and development and marketing expendi-
tures, pre-operating costs, and working capital required for these operations.
The Régie also allows for a reasonable return on the rate base and takes into
account financial ratios, sales forecasts, service quality, competition between
U
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different forms of energy and uniformity of rates throughout Québec (An Act
Respecting the Régie de l’énergie, 2001. Éditeur Officiel du Québec, 2001).
The Act Respecting the Régie de l’énergie 2001 states that to fix rates, the Régie
must consider the cost of acquisition, transmission, and distribution of electric
power. According to the Act, Hydro-Québec is required to supply 165 TWh of
electricity per year to Québec residents at a fixed rate of 2.79 ¢/kWh. Any 
additional load is subject to market-based prices via a tender solicitation process
(Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des Parcs du Québec, 2003).
The Act requires that equal tariffs be charged to any resident of Québec. This
directly implies the cross-subsidization of some rural, residential consumers by
urban consumers and consumers located close to generation facilities. Similarly,
for natural gas, the rates are fixed as a function of the cost of acquisition to the
distributor of gas. The distributor is required by law to supply and deliver natu-
ral gas to anyone within the territory served by their distribution system. Subject
to additional demand by consumers not serviced by the distribution system, the
Régie may order the distributor to extend the network.
3.2 The Electricity Market in Québec
As of December 31st, 2001, Québec had 40,500 MW of available capacity. Most
of this capacity (77%) is owned by Hydro-Québec. Of the remaining capacity,
10.3% is privately owned, 0.1% is owned by municipalities and 12.4% comes
from contracts with Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation which are treated
as domestic capacity (Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des
Parcs du Québec, 2003). The vast majority of the installed capacity comes from
hydro-electric facilities — 91% from domestic hydro-electric facilities of which
10% is from Churchill Falls. Domestic installed capacity breakdown is displayed
The Act Respecting
the Régie de l’énergie
2001 states that to
fix rates, the Régie
must consider the
cost of acquisition,
transmission, and
distribution of 
electric power. 
Figure 2
Domestic Installed Capacity, 2004
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Source: Hydro-Québec, 2004
in Figure 2, with percentages rounded to the nearest integer. In 2003, actual elec-
tricity production was 96.5% hydro-electric, on a total annual generation of
more than 200 billion kWh of electricity.
The hydro capacity in Québec is characterized by large installations. In addi-
tion to the long-term generation contract with Churchill Falls in Labrador,
domestic hydro installations are highly concentrated. As shown in Figure 3, the
La Grand and Manic-Outardes river systems account for 40% and 21% of the
total installed hydro capacity, respectively.
Québec possesses a very extensive network of high-tension power lines linking
the often remote hydro-electric installations with consumers and export markets.
Transmission services are undertaken by TransEnergy, a subsidiary of Hydro-
Québec, which administers more than 32000 km of high-tension  lines and
more than 500 substations. Part of this network of lines allows Hydro-Québec
to export power to other jurisdictions in eastern North America. Thirteen inter-
connections allow for an installed export capacity of 6825 MW, or 55 billion
kWh/year. This compares to actual exports of 17.1 billion kWh in 2001.
TransEnergy has recently initiated approval proceedings for its first rate increase
since 2001, as it seeks authorization for a 1% increase in approved operating
cost figures which determine the rates it can charge Hydro-Québec (Hydro-
Québec press release, September 30, 2004).
With only a couple of exceptions, the inhabited territory of Québec is serviced
by Hydro-Québec’s distribution network. Less than 4% of the total population
of Québec is serviced by independent, municipal grids. Québec domestic
consumption in 2001 stood at 176.6 billion kWh. Of this consumption, approx-
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Figure 3
Domestic Installed Hydro Capacity by River System
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Source: Hydro-Québec, 2004
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imately 51% was industrial, 19% commercial and 30% residential, with small
uses in transportation. Peak-load demand on the system in 2002 was 34989 MW,
or 81% of installed capacity.
Since the nationalization of the electricity market, consumer prices in Québec
have been very low. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, Montréal prices for typical
residential consumption have been lower than in most cities in North America.
This trend appears to be continuing as 2003 prices are relatively lower than those
in 1998, particularly when compared to certain jurisdictions (Seattle prices, for
example were 42 % lower than Montréal in 1998, and 71 % higher in 2003).
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Figure 4
Relative Prices of Electricity, 750 kWh/month consumption 
Source: Hydro-Québec, 1998
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The rates applied to individual consumers in the province vary by their demand
characteristics, but not by location. The evolution of Québec domestic elec-
tricity prices over time is shown in Figure 6, while the relative evolution of these
prices as compared to the rest of Canada is shown in Figure 7. We can see that
the prices of electricity are clearly lower in the hydro-dominated markets of
Québec and BC, and in fact the difference is growing. The difference between
Québec prices and the Canadian average has grown by half a cent since 1981.
(Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des Parcs du Québec, 2003).
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Figure 5
Relative Prices of Electricity, 1000 kWh/month consumption 
Sources: Hydro-Québec, 2003; Parcs du Québec, 2003
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Source: Ministère des Ressources naturelles, 2003
Figure 6
Residential and Commercial Price of Electricity in Québec
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Figure 7
Relative Prices of Electricity by Province
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3.3 The Natural Gas Market in Québec
Québec currently does not produce significant amounts of natural gas. As a
result, domestic demand must be entirely serviced by imports, mostly coming
from Western Canada. The province imported 8.5 billion cubic metres of
natural gas in 2001, of which 2.3 billion cubic metres were re-exported to the
U.S. northeast.
The transportation of natural gas in Québec is handled by TransCanada Pipelines.
Retail-level gas sales are handled in the majority by Gaz Métro, the default
supplier for most of the territory of Québec, which sold 5.9 billion cubic metres,
or 97% of domestic consumption, in 2001 (Gazifère is the default supplier of
natural gas in Gatineau). As of October 2004, costs of network natural gas were
$6.28 per GJ for Gaz Métro. Delivered natural gas prices over time in Québec
are shown in Figure 8, and Québec prices compared to prices in other Canadian
provinces are shown in Figure 9. Differences in delivered gas prices reflect increas-
ing transportation costs the further markets lie from production sites. Clearly,
natural gas prices have been rising in all jurisdictions. The average annual growth
rate in Québec retail prices from 1981 to 2001 was 4.8%, while the same statis-
tic for Canada was 5.1%. The difference between Canada and Québec growth
rates over this time period is not statistically significant. It is therefore clear that,
while gas prices have consistently risen at rates higher than inflation, there is
little divergence between the market in Québec and the market in the rest of
Canada on average. Certainly, Alberta has the lowest retail price in Canada, which
is not surprising since it produces the vast majority of the country’s natural gas
and thus does not have to incur high transportation costs. Québec prices are 4.8
cents higher than the Canadian average over the sample period, with no percep-
tible trend in the difference, reflecting higher transportation costs (Ministère
des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des Parcs du Québec, 2003).
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Source: Ministère des Ressources naturelles, 2003
Figure 8
Network and Delivered Prices of Natural Gas in Québec
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Figure 9
Relative Prices of Delivered Natural Gas
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Energy Market 
Restructuring in Québec
PART FOUR
4.1 Current Restructuring Initiatives in Québec
uébec has recently taken some steps toward the liberalization of its
energy markets. The main reason for this move is that in order to be
able to export its electricity to the restructured markets in the United States,
Québec must conform to certain requirements. When the U.S. FERC restruc-
tured the wholesale electricity market in 1996, it required individual states to
allow the import of electricity generated outside their borders. However, in order
to have access to U.S. transmission systems, foreign jurisdictions had to provide
reciprocal conditions (Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des
Parcs du Québec, 1996). This is why, in 1997, Hydro-Québec unbundled its
transmission and dispatching operations from its generating and sales segments.
TransÉnergie is now responsible for the operation of the transmission grid.
The wholesale electricity market in Québec is evolving towards a monopoly
market with a competitive fringe as a result of recent regulatory changes. Hydro-
Québec’s market share is guaranteed by Law 116, passed on June 16, 2000, which
established the Heritage Pool of electricity. Under this law, Hydro-Québec is
required to supply 165 TWh of electricity per year to Québec consumers at a
fixed rate of 2.79 ¢/kWh. Any additional load is subject to market-based prices
via a tender solicitation process. Tenders are not necessarily open, as they may
be constrained to a particular type of generation, or to a particular location. The
Québec government has stated that it would like these tenders to allow the private
sector to have access to hydraulic resources, but only to sites with less than 
50 MW of power. Larger sites will remain the exclusive territory of Hydro-Québec
(Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de la Faune et des Parcs du Québec, 1996).
The most recent call for tenders was to provide 1000 MW of wind energy to
Québec consumers.
Q
In the natural gas market, fixed-price, institutional contracts are also currently
available for consumers of 7500 m3 or more annually, administered by eleven
independent service providers. For residential customers, rates charged by  the
default suppliers remain fixed by the Régie de l’Énergie.
In addition to wanting access to restructured U.S. markets, the government
might consider restructuring in order to achieve the efficiency gains discussed
above, if indeed the production or retail side of Québec’s energy markets do not
represent natural monopoly situations. However, further restructuring of Québec’s
energy markets would not be easy, due to a number of conditions. Most impor-
tant is the fact that Québec’s electricity market is hydro dominated and a 
big proportion of the generating capacity is provided by large complexes on 
individual river systems. We discuss this issue below. Beyond this, the fact that
Québec insists on uniform rates for rural and urban energy consumers makes
restructuring more difficult. Moreover, the Ministry of Natural Resources insists
that any restructuring of the electricity market must be done without compro-
mising the health of Hydro-Québec (Ministère des Ressources naturelles, de 
la Faune et des Parcs du Québec, 1996). Also, Hydro-Québec currently has 
$32.5 billion in long-term debt, and an asset value of $58 billion. If divestiture
were to take place, this debt would have to be assigned to assets at the time of
sale. The net proceeds of these sales, the stranded debt or surplus, would have
to be transferred to Québec consumers, either in the form of taxes/subsidies or
through charges/rebates on electricity consumption.
Raphals (1997)  notes other effects of restructuring that must be considered. In
particular, he comments on the impact on prices of permitting American access
to electricity generated in Québec. It is intuitive that the northeastern states want
access to the power market in Québec as a result of generally lower production
(and thus wholesale) costs. If Québec’s spot market for power is opened up to
US consumers, higher US retail (and equally wholesale) prices can only serve to
increase domestic prices. This is contrary to what is normally expected from the
opening up of markets — that restructuring will yield significant medium-term
price decreases. It is reasonable to expect that prices will rise for many domes-
tic and commercial users in Québec in a more deregulated market.
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4.2 Restructuring in Hydro-Dominated Electricity
Markets
The case for restructuring has been made successfully in markets where load is
handled principally by relatively small, fossil fuel-fired generators. It is argued
that in this situation the market can be served at lower cost by small, indepen-
dent producers bidding to supply power to a pool, as a result of a lack of inter-
dependency of input supply and the fact that no firm can exercise market power.
In hydro-dominated markets this may not be the case. Restructuring may not
result in greater efficiencies, as firms may still have too much market power
and/or externalities may be generated. Market power may arise as a result of the
ability of hydro plants to defer production to later time periods. Externalities
may be generated since, in a hydro-dominated market, the key input, water, is
not priced according to its true value within a river system. Moreover, this effect
is magnified in the presence of cascaded power plants on the same river system.
Raphals (2001) discusses the possibility for hydro producers to exercise market
power. Provided a reservoir exists, hydro producers possess an ability to defer
sales which is not present with other generating technologies. Thermal genera-
tors cannot defer sales, although they can act to reduce sales in the present time.
Raphals argues that the ease with which hydro plants can adjust output, and 
the inability to distinguish the exercise of market power from water resource
management, implies an ability to manipulate the market in more sophisticated
ways. It has been alleged that Hydro-Québec has used the nature of its produc-
tion resources for market manipulation in the northeastern U.S. Specifically, it
was challenged by the FERC for profiting from arbitrage opportunities in the
forward energy market produced as a result of its ability to influence market
prices (Raphals, 2001).
Market-power abuse is most easily solved by reducing the market share of
individual producers. One possible means of achieving this is to open the market
to producers and consumers from other jurisdictions. This is the approach 
taken by Norway, the only country in the world in which a larger fraction of elec-
tricity is hydro generated than in Québec, as 99% of its capacity is hydro-electric.
Since 1990, Norway has been restructuring its energy markets. The Energy Act of
1990 called for the breakup, but not privatization, of Statkraft, the state-owned,
vertically integrated utility. There are approximately 70 firms producing electric-
ity in Norway, but Statkraft has retained 30% of the generating capacity, while
Hydro Energy has 10%. The remaining firms are primarily owned and operated
by municipalities (Aam and Wangensteen, 2004). These producers have access to
Nord Pool, which unites the electricity markets of Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Finland and Iceland. Producers and consumers can form bilateral contracts, and
may also trade forward contracts on a futures market (Wolak, 2004).
Restructuring may
not result in greater
efficiencies, as firms
may still have too
much market power
and/or externalities
may be generated.
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It appears that this approach allows potential market-power effects to be 
mitigated (Aam and Wangensteen, 2004). This is important in the context of
the Québec energy market, since the access to a larger overall market reduces
the effective market power of a single producer. If no priority is given to Québec
producers on the spot market, the entry of producers from Ontario, New York,
and elsewhere could drastically reduce the market share of any Québec produc-
tion facility. In this case, the interconnection capacity would become an impor-
tant determining factor for efficiency.
In addition to market-power-abuse problems, hydro-dominated generation 
externalities may be generated since in a hydro-dominated market, water is not
priced according to its true value. Regardless of where plants are located on 
separate or common river systems, reservoir volume and downstream flows
generally do not have a market value. Thus, the private, variable costs of elec-
tricity production for any firm will not reflect the true cost of generation. Dunsky
and Raphals (1998) state that a power pool is meant to serve as a clearinghouse
through which market prices come to reflect (largely predictable) variable costs,
but that, in this environment, hydro-electric generators would be led to effec-
tively give away their power since the variable costs are generally almost nil. In
fact, this captures the essence of market failure. Hydro producers will sell their
power at their marginal private cost, which in this case is near zero, without
regard for the social costs, which leads to the inefficiencies. For example, they
are likely to only take account of the private option value of water held in reser-
voirs, not the social value. Abstracting for the moment from the costs of trans-
mission, consider the opportunity costs involved in the production of electric-
ity. First, a cubic metre of water held in a reservoir above the dam has a value,
despite the fact that it is renewable, which is tied to the expected future price of
water and electricity. There are costs related to the watershed as a whole even if
there is just a single dam. A cubic metre of water used in generation today has
a value to other downstream users such as agriculture and consumers.
Furthermore, reservoir volume has a value in its ability to mitigate hydrologi-
cal fluctuations. Since the upstream firm does not have to pay for lost flow down-
stream, and is not directly compensated for its role in water management, this
represents an externality problem and water will not be efficiently allocated on
the river system.
To capture the potential impacts of these external effects, consider the example
of market restructuring in Brazil, another hydro-dominated market. The govern-
ment felt that it would be feasible to rely on private investment to provide new
generation capacity. Mensah-Bonsu and Oren (2002) state that reservoir capac-
ity was not priced in the new market system, so hydro producers were artifi-
cially able to meet demand at low marginal cost. Because of this, the system’s
reservoirs were depleted at a rate much greater than would have been optimal
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if the stored water had been accorded its true value. As a result of the fact that
hydro power was supplied below its social costs, investment in new generating
facilities has not kept pace with load. New plants would not be able to recoup
investments in fixed costs when existing hydro plants can offer power to the grid
at essentially zero cost.
Now, consider how these problems are magnified in the case where multiple
plants are arranged on a single watershed. It is clear that hydro plants at the head
of the river system can influence the availability of water to plants and other
uses further downstream. For electricity markets, this can generate market power.
Consider an extreme example in which a single river system contains a reser-
voir with a small-capacity dam at its head and a large plant further downstream.
While it may represent only a small proportion of the generating capacity, and
cannot directly influence price through its choice of supply, the production 
decision of the small plant implicitly affects downstream production, and thus
the market price.
The fact that water is not generally a priced input or output leads to the exter-
nality problem discussed above. Since a firm which owned all of the plants on
a river system would take into account all of the external effects on production
imposed by one plant on another, it is generally accepted that hydro plant divesti-
ture should occur by river system, and not by individual dam (Dunsky and
Raphals, 1998). This presents a particular challenge for Québec, since this would
require divesting a very large complex such as La Grande as a single entity. This
complex accounts for 40% of installed capacity in Québec, and so divestiture
would result in the type of market-power effects described above.
As discussed earlier, the presence of externalities may be justification for regu-
lation, but maintaining a single producer over an entire watershed is only one
option for correcting this market failure. Downstream users should be willing
to pay for water flow. If all the generation facilities are arranged such that a single
firm owns all the dams on a river, these costs and benefits are all internalized;
however, if these facilities are individually divested, price mechanisms can be
used to generate the same outcome.
Suppose one wanted to tax efficiently the disruption of flow on a river. The
marginal external cost of storing a cubic metre in the reservoir of an upstream
dam would thus be the willingness to pay of all downstream consumers of water
for this flow. More pertinently, this could be solved recursively, such that the tax
on each dam represents only what the next downstream user would be willing
to pay for water in a particular period. Approaching from the river delta toward
the head, this implies that all downstream value will be taken into account by
the furthest upstream firm. If the tax were set efficiently, the downstream
The fact that water
is not generally a
priced input or
output leads to the
externality problem
discussed above.
B
U
R
G
U
N
D
Y
R
E
P
O
R
T
C
IR
A
N
O
36
consumers of water would be indifferent between receiving compensation in
the amount of the tax, or receiving an additional cubic metre of water during
that period. Given the imposition of this efficient tax, the external impact of the
upstream dam on downstream producers will be internalized. The productive
capacity of the dam farthest downstream will therefore implicitly figure in the
production decisions of all upstream facilities, even without them being owned
by the same company.
The same outcome created by taxes could be accomplished by the distribution
and exchange of flow rights, provided the latter could occur with low transac-
tion costs. Each facility would have flow rights in their possession and an upstream
dam would have to purchase these rights from the downstream firms in order
to decrease production and store water in their reservoir. As long as a system
with reasonably low transaction costs exists for the purchase and sale of flow
rights, and no market power exists in this market, this can produce the same
result as the efficient tax, as discussed in the seminal paper by Coase (1960).
Doucet and Ambec (2001, 2003) analyze the issue of restructuring within and
among cascaded hydro projects. Their work is based on the theoretical tenets
examined in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Specifically, they show the analog
to the Coase result: for two hydro plants located on the same river, an environ-
ment with zero coordination costs and a market for water-flow rights will produce
the same outcome, and thus the same level of welfare, as a single firm would
choose.
The above arguments suggest that having a large hydro-electric producer on 
the grid may lead to greater market-power abuse. Québec’s hydropower instal-
lations render this question one of particular importance for restructuring. As
mentioned above, over 95% of installed capacity is hydro-generated and the vast
majority of provincial installed capacity depends on three river systems. Moreover,
the large complexes operating on each of these river systems are each made up
of a number of facilities. The La Grande complex, for instance, is composed of
thirteen facilities of varying size lying on the same watershed. Given the above
discussion, it seems that the imposition of a mechanism for the pricing of river
flow and reservoir storage, or the opening of the Québec wholesale market to a
much larger set of producers, are necessary conditions for the restructuring of
electricity in Québec.
...having a large hydro-electric
producer on the grid may lead to
greater market-power abuse.
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Discussion and Conclusion
PART FIVE
uébec’s electricity market does not represent a typical case for the
restructuring of the production side since the vast majority of its
generating capacity comes from hydro projects. Furthermore, this capacity is
highly concentrated on three river systems. The usual model of forced divesti-
ture by hydrologic system is therefore likely to introduce market power in a
restructured market, and likely to lead to greater inefficiencies than those present
under regulation. If any market restructuring is to succeed, a system of trade-
able water rights would have to be established in parallel with a competitive
power pool in order to allow divestiture of individual plants within a river system.
The retail segment of Québec’s natural gas and electricity markets could poten-
tially benefit from liberalization. The only obvious difference between Québec’s
energy markets and those in other jurisdictions is Québec’s price-equalization
policy. Lower prices could prevail if competition were introduced in the market,
but not for all consumers. Québec’s insistence on uniform prices throughout
the province means that some consumers (namely, rural consumers) are currently
paying below market price for energy. Prices for these consumers could rise if
the market is restructured.
This report characterizes the regulation of energy markets in general and focuses
on the electricity and natural gas markets of Québec. Markets are regulated if
they are deemed to represent natural monopoly situations or if unregulated
firms would not take into account externalities that they might generate. However,
in recent years certain segments of some energy markets have been liberalized
since these segments may not be natural monopoly situations and/or the market
may provide means to ensure that firms internalize externalities.
We have presented standard conditions that must be satisfied in order for dereg-
ulation to be successful. In order to reinforce the importance of the elimination
of market power and adhesion to these necessary conditions, four case studies
were presented. These demonstrate quite clearly that, under certain conditions,
deregulation can lead to welfare improvements. However, the downside risk is
great if these standard conditions are not met.
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